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Abstract 
PikettǇ͛s ŵaiŶ theoƌetiĐal prediction is that a small elite will own all wealth if capitalism is left 
to its own devices. We formulate and calibrate a Post-Keynesian model with an endogenous 
distƌiďutioŶ of ǁealth ďetǁeeŶ ǁoƌkeƌs aŶd Đapitalists. The ŵodel peƌŵits PikettǇ͛s ĐoƌŶeƌ 
solution of all wealth held by capitalists; however, it also shows that interior solutions with a 
stable, non-zero wealth share of workers, a stable wealth-to-income ratio, and a stable and 
positive gap between the profit and the growth rate determined by the Cambridge equation. 
Furthermore, simulations shoǁ that the ŵodel ĐoŶfoƌŵs to PikettǇ͛s eŵpiƌiĐal fiŶdiŶgs in a 
transitional phase, in which the wealth share of capitalists rises to over 60%, the wealth-to-
income ratio increases, and income inequality rises. Finally, we show that the introduction of 
a wealth tax as suggested by Piketty could neutralize the rise in wealth concentration. 
 
1. Introduction 
Thoŵas PikettǇ͛s ďest-selliŶg ďook ͚Capital iŶ the Ϯϭst CeŶtuƌǇ͛ ;PikettǇ ϮϬϭϰͿ tƌiggered a 
renewed interest in empirical research regarding the accumulation and distribution of wealth, 
and a lively debate about their causes and consequences. Wealth determines income, power 
and opportunities, and lies at the very heart of economic inequalities. Understanding the 
dynamics of wealth accumulation and distribution is thus crucial to tackle these inequalities. 
In a nutshell, Piketty͛s (2014) theoretical argument is that, since the profit rate is usually higher 
than the growth rate in an economy (an empirical regularity which he finds for most countries 
and time periods), wealth increases over time faster than income. This entails a more unequal 
distribution of income, because the share of profits increases and wealth ownership and 
capital income are more concentrated than labour income. A rising income inequality finally 
feeds back into a more unequal distribution of wealth, so that wealth will be ever-increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of a small elite. 
Empirically, Piketty (2014) provides extensive data on the historical evolution of wealth-to-
income ratios, wealth, and the personal income distribution. He shows that the wealth-to-
income ratio has risen, and that wealth and income have become more unequally distributed 
in high-income countries since about the 1980s. Regarding the profit rate and the growth rate, 
he argues that they have been largely stable over the long run, but that the former is 
empirically higher than the latter. 
The reception of the book in Post-Keynesian economics has been mixed. On the one hand, 
Post-Keynesian economists recognize the empirical contributions of the book: the collection 
of historical data and the carving out of observable patterns therein (Rowthorn 2014, Rehm 
and Schnetzer 2015, King 2017Ϳ. OŶ the otheƌ haŶd, PikettǇ͛s siŵple, neoclassical theoretical 
framework by which he explains the dynamics of wealth and income inequality has attracted 
the criticism of Post-Keynesian economists, in whose theoretical frameworks distribution has 
long played a major role (e.g. Galbraith 2014, Palley 2014, López-Bernardo et al. 2016a). Based 
on the Cambridge equation (Pasinetti 1962), they point out that the wealth distribution in the 
long run can be stable, a statement that is clearly in contradiction to PikettǇ͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶ. 
Not only does Post-Keynesian theory show that the distribution of wealth can be stable in the 
long run, but it is also capable of explaining the short-run dynamic of wealth accumulation and 
distribution that PikettǇ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ pƌeseŶts aďuŶdaŶt eŵpiƌiĐal eǀideŶĐe foƌ. IŶ the ͚tƌansitional 
phase͛, i.e. ǁheŶ the ǁealth shaƌe of Đapitalists is ďeloǁ its loŶg-run equilibrium value, a rising 
wealth-to-income ratio and  increasingly unequal distributions of wealth and income are all 
perfectly compatible with Post-Keynesian theory. Due to its focus on the long run, these short-
run dynamics have not been investigated by PikettǇ͛s Post-Keynesian critics so far. The paper 
intends to close this gap. 
To do so, we build a Post-Keynesian model in the tradition of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) by 
incorporating an endogenous wealth distribution. We extend the model by blended incomes 
of workers and capitalists, differential rates of return, and capital gains. We show that a stable 
wealth share is a likely outcome in the long run, and both the euthanasia and the triumph of 
the rentier are special cases, aŶd thus ƌeiteƌate the ĐƌitiƋue of PikettǇ͛s hǇpothesis of an ever-
increasing wealth concentration. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, ǁe use the ŵodel to eǆplaiŶ a ͚tƌaŶsitioŶal 
dǇŶaŵiĐ͛ that ƌeseŵďles the eŵpiƌiĐal eǀideŶĐe presented by Piketty and his projections to 
the future. A rising wealth-to-income ratio, rising wealth and income inequality and a profit 
rate that is higher than the growth rate of the capital stock (and thus income) are all consistent 
with our extended Post-Keynesian model. Finally, we show that a wealth tax, as suggested by 
Piketty, reduces both wealth and income inequality. 
The paper is structured as follows. The literature review in section 2 discusses both Piketty 
and his Post-Keynesian critics, as well as the Post-Keynesian models of distribution. Section 3 
describes the model and its extensions in detail. Section 4 presents a numerical simulation of 
both short-run dynamics and the long-run equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the effects of a 
wealth tax. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Piketty and the Post-Keynesians  
Piketty (2014)͛s theoƌetiĐal fƌaŵeǁoƌk, formally elaborated in Piketty and Zucman (2014), 
consists of two so-called ͚fundamental laws͛ and a ͚fundamental contradiction of capitalism͛. 
Piketty͛s fiƌst law states that the share of income from capital in total national income is equal 
to the rate of profit times the wealth-income ratio, or ߙ = ݎ × ߚ, an accounting identity 
(Piketty 2014: 52).  The second law is the Harrod-Domar equation (Piketty and Zucman 2014: 
1274) that the ratio of wealth to income equals the ratio of the saving rate to the growth rate. 
IŶ PikettǇ͛s deŶotatioŶ, ߚ = ݏ �⁄  (Piketty 2014: 166). PikettǇ͛s fundamental contradiction 
argues that wealth (which he treats synonymously to capital) increases faster than income if 
the profit rate is higher than the growth rate of GDP, i.e. if the oft-cited formula ݎ > � holds 
(Piketty 2014: 571). PikettǇ͛s aŶalǇsis is ďased on a neoclassical production function, it 
assumes that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is higher than one 
(Piketty and Zucman 2014: 1271), and the rate of profit is technologically determined (Piketty 
and Zucman 2014: 1270). 
Empirically, Piketty͛s ǁoƌk is gƌouŶd-breaking in the breadth and depth of his coverage of both 
wealth and income time series. In particular, he documents an increasingly unequal 
distribution of wealth (Piketty 2014: 332f), rising wealth-to-income ratios (ibid.: 164f), and an 
increasing concentration of the personal income distribution (ibid.: 290f) in Europe and the 
U.S., roughly since the 1980s. He also documents a slowing growth rate (ibid.: 93f) and a 
declining rate of return (ibid: 199f) over that time horizon, even though he sees both as 
roughly stable over the long run. CƌuĐiallǇ foƌ his aƌguŵeŶt, he fiŶds his ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal 
ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ͛ of Đapitalisŵ to be empirically valid for most economies and historical periods, 
i.e. the profit rate to be higher than the growth rate (ibid: 350f). Piketty sees a number of 
positive feedback mechanisms, which lead to an ever-increasing inequality in the distribution 
of income and wealth. Barring political intervention and notwithstanding his detailed 
discussion of institutional and systemic factors in the wealth distribution, following this train 
of thought to its logiĐal ĐoŶĐlusioŶ ŵeaŶs that PikettǇ͛s ŵaiŶ pƌediĐtioŶ is that all ǁealth ǁill 
be concentrated in the hand of a very small elite. 
The Post-KeǇŶesiaŶ aŶd stƌuĐtuƌalist ƌeĐeptioŶ of PikettǇ͛s ǁoƌk has ďeeŶ laƌgelǇ sĐeptiĐal. 
King͛s (2016) comprehensive review summarizes the arguments (of neoclassical, Austrian and 
Post-Keynesian economists) in nine over-arching points of critique. These range from 
differences in opinion regarding the relevance of wealth inequality and the suggested policy 
conclusions, but also empirical disagreements and theoretical critiques, the latter including 
the importance of institutions and of low-income countries. Relevant for this paper are the 
two critiques that 1) ͞PikettǇ uses the ǁƌoŶg ;ŶeoĐlassiĐalͿ theoƌǇ͟ ;KiŶg ϮϬϭϲ: 7) and 2) that 
the ͞predicted increase in wealth is implausible͟ ;KiŶg ϮϬϭϲ: 3).  
Regarding the first point, many Post-Keynesian and structuralist economists criticized Piketty 
for using a neoclassical framework. Piketty (2014: 230f) misrepresents the Cambridge capital 
controversy of the 1950s and 1960s (Galbraith, 2014; Palley, 2014; López-Bernardo et al. 
2016a), which showed that neoclassical economics is logically inconsistent in its valuation of 
capital since the value of capital is simultaneously determined by and determines the rate of 
profit (Harcourt, 1972; Felipe and McCombie, 2013). Connected to this is the critique of 
PikettǇ͛s conflation of wealth and capital. In particular, Post-Keynesians and Marxists objected 
to treating housing wealth as productive capital, measuring wealth at highly volatile market 
prices untethered from ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal͛ values (Duménil and Levy 2014, Rowthorn, 2014).3  
The bulk of Post-Keynesian the criticism was directed at the second point (López-Bernardo et 
al., 2016; Michl, 2014; Rowthorn, 2014; Taylor, 2014; van Treek, 2015). As discussed, from 
PikettǇ͛s fuŶdaŵeŶtal laǁs aŶd iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ the inequality ݎ > � follows a long-run dynamics 
of wealth accumulation that leads to an ever-increasing share of wealth concentrated in the 
hands of capitalists. Treating the variables as independent, van Treek (2015) numerically 
                                                          
3 We ďƌieflǇ addƌess this ͚ǀaluatioŶ pƌoďleŵ͛ iŶ the ŵodel seĐtioŶ, aŶd take the laƌgeƌ poiŶt ƌegaƌdiŶg pƌoduĐtiǀe 
(rather than total) capital on board in the formulation of our model. 
illustrates that the profit rate exceeding the growth rate is not a sufficient condition for the 
wealth-to-income ratio and inequality continue to rise indefinitely. Differential saving rates of 
households with different positions in the income distribution are a necessary precondition 
for PikettǇ͛s ĐoŶĐlusioŶ to hold, aŶd the ǁealth distƌiďutioŶ is highlǇ seŶsitiǀe to Đhanges in 
these differential saving rates. 
Based on PasiŶetti͛s Caŵďƌidge eƋuatioŶ ݏ�ݎ = � (i.e., the equilibrium growth rate equals the 
saving rate of capitalists times the profit rate), Taylor (2014) argues that the two corner 
solutions euthanasia and the triumph of the rentier, as well as an interior solution, are all 
possible results. He focuses on the interaction between the wealth share of capitalists, 
capacity utilization and the profit share, and points out that the feedback mechanisms 
between these variables can stabilize or destabilize the system, depending on the structure of 
the economy. He shows that a rising wealth share entails the possibility of a rising profit share 
and chronic underutilisation of production capacities and stagnation in the long run, if the 
profit share responds strongly positively to an increase in the wealth share. 
López-Bernardo et al. (2016a) also focus on the long run and the Cambridge equation. They 
argue that the profit rate must necessarily always be greater than the growth rate, provided 
that capitalists͛ saǀiŶgs ƌate is less thaŶ uŶitǇ ;that is, they consume a certain share of their 
income). PikettǇ͛s empirical finding that r is greater than g is thus fully consistent with a stable 
income distribution and, by extension, a stable wealth distribution. Only if the profit rate 
exceeds the ratio of the growth rate and the saving rate of capitalists will there be 
redistribution from wages to profits, and thus a rising profit share and ultimately, a rising 
concentration of wealth. Furthermore, although individual capitalists can increase their rate 
of accumulation by saving more, capitalists as a whole cannot, because an increase in the 
saving rate would inevitably entail a fall in the profit rate. López-Bernardo et al. (2016a) argue 
that Piketty overlooked this ͚fallaĐǇ of ĐoŵpositioŶ͛, even though he explicitly discusses (but 
dismisses by referring to technology) its relevance (Piketty 2014: 215f). However, they point 
out that PikettǇ͛s cumulative feedback mechanism between accumulation and wealth 
concentration is indeed valid when it comes to personal income distribution, in particular 
among capitalists, because they have no access to wage income in a simple formulation.4 
Post-Keynesian models are well suited for the analysis of both short- and long-run dynamics 
of wealth accumulation and distribution. They have long been used to investigate the 
distribution between labour and capital in the wage-/profit-led debate (Bhaduri and Marglin 
1990, Stockhammer and Ederer 2008, Stockhammer et al. 2009, Lavoie and Stockhammer 
2013, Barbosa and Taylor 2006, Kiefer and Rada 2015) and the distribution of personal income 
(Lavoie 2009, Carvalho and Rezai 2016, Palley 2017a). It is therefore indeed vexing that 
PikettǇ͛s ǁƌitiŶg shoǁs Ŷo ƌeĐeptioŶ of the eǆteŶsiǀe Post-Keynesian body of literature on the 
theory of distributions.  
                                                          
4 Meade (1964) points out this disadvantage. Pasinetti (1974) argues that the thriftiest group among capitalists 
will eventually dominate the others, as noted by Taylor (2014). We return to this point in the following section. 
Two seminal Post-Keynesian models of the distribution of wealth are Palley (2012, 2017b) and 
Taylor et al. (2015). In Taylor et al.͛s (2015) model, workers receive blended wage and profit 
income. The model incorporates capital gains due to its empirical relevance in the US. Taylor 
et al. (2015) simulate a wealth concentration ratio of about 60% - the top 1% owns roughly 
ϲϬ% of total ǁealth. Wealth is split ďetǁeeŶ ͞the ƌiĐh͟ aŶd the ͞ŵiddle Đlass-ǁoƌkeƌs͟, as the 
͞ďottoŵ ϲϬ%͟ empirically do not own any wealth. Palley͛s (2017b) model also includes an 
endogenous wealth distribution. The paper permits doubly blended income sources – both 
workers and capitalists receive both work and profit income in a Post-Keynesian framework. 
The parameters influencing the personal income distribution (and growth) are the functional 
income distribution, the distribution of the wage bill between workers and capitalists, and the 
distribution of wealth between workers and capitalists. The latter, in turn, depends on the 
differential propensities to save. 
Post-Keynesian models have paid less attention to the transitory dynamics for the phase 
during which the wealth share (and, indeed, the functional and personal income distribution) 
differ from their (long-run) equilibria. The differential equations often used by the profit-led 
strand of the literature (and their concomitant VAR analyses) lend themselves to investigating 
these transition phases. Indeed, Taylor (2014) derives a differential equation for the wealth 
share. However, the paper then focuses on stable and instable equilibria, while pointing to 
possible feedback mechanisms between the distribution of wealth with the profit share and 
capacity utilization. 
This paper extends the model of Ederer and Rehm (2017), which follows the Post-Keynesian 
tradition along the lines of Palley (2017b) and Taylor et al. (2015) with an endogenous wealth 
distribution in a two-class economy. The ƋuestioŶ ǁe aƌe askiŶg is, ǁhetheƌ PikettǇ͛s eŵpiƌiĐal 
evidence regarding a rising wealth share for decades can be integrated into a Post-Keynesian 
model, which permits for interior solutions rather than the corner solution of the entire wealth 
concentrated in the hands of capital. The main aim is to investigate the transition phase 
between short- and long-run dynamics of wealth accumulation and distribution, and thereby 
contribute to closing this gap in the Post-Keynesian literature of growth models. 
 
3. A Model of the Wealth Distribution 
The model is a standard two-class, Post-Keynesian formulation in the tradition of Bhaduri and 
Marglin (1990), drawing on Palley (2017b) and Taylor et al. (2015) and closely following Ederer 
and Rehm (2017)5. We introduce four innovations: (1) Wealth is accumulated through saving; 
(2) blended wage and capital income goes to both workers and capitalists; (3) beyond 
differential savings rates, workers and capitalists also have differential returns on their assets; 
(4) firms save and accumulate wealth, which is passed on to owners of shares via capital gains. 
                                                          
5 The model is briefly restated here for the convenience of the reader, since we discuss the solution and the 
relevance of our aŶalǇtiĐal assuŵptioŶs ƌelatiŶg to PikettǇ͛s theoƌetiĐal aŶd eŵpiƌiĐal defiŶitioŶs iŶ detail. 
Section 3a introduces a basic version of the model, and section 3b includes extensions (2) to 
(4). 
a. Basic model 
In the basic formulation of the model, income Y is divided between total profits R and the 
wage bill W according to the (exogenous) functional income distribution � (the profit share). � = �� ܹ = ሺͳ − �ሻ� 
All wages accrue to workers in the simple version of the model. Income of capitalists (subscript 
r) thus amounts to profits R on their share of wealth z. Workers (denoted by subscript w) also 
receive a part of profits R proportional to their share of wealth ownership (1 – z), which 
together with wages make up total income of workers ��.  �� = �� �� = ܹ + ሺͳ − �ሻ� 
We follow Post-Keynesian convention by assuming a positive differential between savings 
rates of capitalists ݏ� and workers ݏ�. Per definition, consumption propensities of workers and 
capitalists multiply with their respective incomes for total consumption C.  ܥ = ሺͳ − ݏ�ሻ�� + ሺͳ − ݏ�ሻ�� 
The investment equation is formulated according to the standard Post-Keynesian functional 
form in the Bhaduri-Marglin tradition, i.e. growth of the capital stock K depends on capacity 
utilization u and the profit share �. This formulation allows for both wage-led and profit-led 
demand growth regimes, depending on the values of the parameters ߚଵ and ߚଶ and the saving 
rates. � = ሺߚ଴ + ߚଵݑ + ߚଶ�ሻܭ 
The aggregate goods market is in equilibrium, output equals demand. Since we abstract from 
all sectors other than households and firms, total demand consists of consumption and 
investment.6  � = ܥ + � 
In order to de-trend income, profits, and investment, we follow convention by normalizing 
them to the capital stock. This yields stable solutions for capacity utilization u, the profit rate 
r and the growth rate of the capital stock g. ݑ = �ܭ 
                                                          
6 The abstraction from government and an external sector is in line with Piketty (2014), who in much of his work 
omits them on empirical grounds following careful examination of their importance and valuation problems. 
ݎ = �ܭ = �ݑ � = �ܭ 
The only asset in the model is productive wealth V, which is equal to the capital stock K. The 
ownership of (productive) capital entitles to the receipt of the corresponding share in profits. 
Both workers and capitalists accumulate wealth through savings. The level of savings is the 
difference between income and consumption. 
In foĐusiŶg oŶ pƌoduĐtiǀe Đapital, ǁe take aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt stƌaŶd of ĐƌitiĐisŵ of PikettǇ͛s 
neoclassical basis, discussed in section 2, on board, eǀeŶ though ǁe appƌeĐiate PikettǇ͛s 
argument that wealth categories are to a certain degree fungible. Departing from total wealth 
as measured in microeconomic surveys introduces a potential wedge between PikettǇ͛s aŶd 
our empirical results, since the critiques were not solely based on theoretical arguments 
regarding unproductive capital, but also revolved around a rising empirical importance of 
housing wealth as a share of total private wealth (Duménil and Levy, 2014). Our model is 
conceptually based on capital (rather than wealth), since it is adapted from a framework which 
focuses on productive investment and growth. Because productive wealth is distributed more 
unequally (i.e., housing is distributed more equally), our simulations are on the conservative 
side as we are more likely to fiŶd PikettǇ͛s eǆtƌeŵe iŶeƋualitǇ. 
In order to tƌaĐe the ďehaǀiouƌ of the ŵodel Đoŵpaƌed to PikettǇ͛s empirical evidence, we 
include the wealth-to-income ratio � (which is the inverse of capacity utilization u) and the 
ƌatio of Đapitalists͛ to ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶĐoŵe, as a measure for the personal income distribution ߠ in 
the model. � = ܭ� = ͳݑ ߠ = ���� 
 
Table 1: Stocks and flows in the Post-Keynesian model with endogenous wealth distribution 
 Households Firms  
 Workers Capitalists Current Capital Total 
Consumption −ܥ� −ܥ� +ܥ  0 
Investment   +� −� 0 
Wages +ܹ  −ܹ  0 
Profits +�� +�� −�  0 
Wealth −∆ �ܸ −∆ �ܸ  +∆ܭ 0 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: own elaboration. 
 Table 1 shows the stock-flow matrix of the model. A plus sign denotes a source of funds, a 
minus sign is a use of funds, and rows and columns sum to zero. Firms pay wage income to 
workers (row 3), and distribute profits (row 4), which both workers and capitalists receive. 
Workers and capitalists consume their income (row 1), and firms invest (row 2). Both workers 
and capitalists save and thus accumulate wealth in the form of productive capital (row 5). 
Households͛ saǀiŶgs fiŶaŶĐe fiƌŵs͛ iŶǀestŵeŶt ;ĐoluŵŶ ϰͿ. 
 
b. Short-run equilibrium 
The short-run solution of the model assumes wealth shares to be constant, since wealth 
accumulates over long time periods. Capacity utilization, the profit rate and the growth rate 
adjust simultaneously, so that the equilibrium in the aggregate goods market (i.e. the IS-
condition) is fulfilled for any wealth share of capitalists z. The short-run solutions for these 
three variables thus depend on the distribution of wealth: ݑ∗ = ߚ଴ + ߚଶ�ݏ� +  ሺݏ� − ݏ�ሻ�� − ߚଵ ݎ∗ = ߚ଴� + ߚଶ�ଶݏ� +  ሺݏ� − ݏ�ሻ�� − ߚଵ �∗ = ሺߚ଴ + ߚଶ�ሻ[ݏ� + ሺݏ� − ݏ�ሻ�� ]ݏ� + ሺݏ� − ݏ�ሻ�� − ߚଵ  
In particular, a higher wealth share of capitalists lowers capacity utilization, the profit rate and 
the growth rate of the capital stock. The reason is that a higher wealth share of capitalists 
transfers profit income to capitalists, which depresses total consumption due to capitalists͛ 
higher saving rate.  
Contrary to a rise in the profit share, which can either raise or reduce the growth rate 
(depending on whether growth is wage-led or profit-led), a rise in the wealth share 
unambiguously depresses growth, since consumption decreases and there is no counteracting 
effect on investment. The latter is determined by the profitability of firms, not by the 
distribution of profits among workers and capitalists. Note that the profit rate is more sensible 
to the wealth share than the growth rate, because its effect on the latter works indirectly via 
capacity utilization. This is the reason why the profit rate decreases faster than the growth 
rate when the wealth share rises, and the two variables will eventually fulfil the Cambridge 
equation (see below). 
Since the wealth-to-income ratio x is the inverse of capacity utilisation, it increases the more 
wealth is concentrated in the hands of capitalists. Likewise, the personal income distribution 
as measured by the ratio of income of capitalists to the income of workers, ߠ, is more unequal 
when the wealth share of capitalists is high, because a higher share of profits accrues to 
capitalists in that case.  �∗ = ݏ� + ሺݏ� − ݏ�ሻ�� − ߚଵߚ଴ + ߚଶ�  ߠ∗ = ��ͳ − �� 
 
c. Long-term equilibrium 
Over time, both capitalists and workers accumulate wealth until the wealth share adjusts to 
its long-term equilibrium. Pasinetti͛s (1962) Cambridge equation ݏ�ݎ = � implies that the 
wealth share is stable when capitalists save exactly the amount that corresponds to their share 
in the increase in total capital (Palley, 2012, 2017b; Taylor, 2014). Consequently, Palley 
;ϮϬϭϳďͿ poiŶts out that the Caŵďƌidge eƋuatioŶ should ďe iŶteƌpƌeted as aŶ ͚oǁŶeƌship 
equilibrium condition͛, since capitalists must save just enough to maintain their ownership 
share. 
Since both the profit rate and the growth rate depend on the wealth share of capitalists z, we 
get a long-run equilibrium value for the wealth distribution: �∗∗ = ݏ�� − ݏ�ሺݏ� −  ݏ�ሻ� 
As long as difference between the saving rates of workers and capitalists is sufficiently high, 
the equilibrium value for z is positive. The (long-run) distribution of wealth only depends on 
the differential saving rates and the profit share. Capitalists͛ long-run equilibrium wealth share 
z** is higher: (1) the higher the profit share, (2) the higher the saving rate of capitalists, and 
(3) the lower the saving rate of workers. It does however not depend on the growth rate (i.e. 
on the parameters of the investment equation), which contradicts Piketty͛s argument. In the 
long-run equilibrium, in our model the wealth share is constant, so each class has to save the 
exact amount that keeps their wealth share constant, independent of how slowly or how fast 
the economy grows. 
There are two corner solutions for the wealth share: (1) If workers do not save at all, all wealth 
will (naturally) be concentrated in the hand of capitalists (� = ͳ). In this case, the share of 
total income going to profits is the only determinant of the distribution of income. (2) If 
capitalists do not save, it is self-evident that eventually all wealth will belong to workers (� =Ͳ). Furthermore, if the two saving rates are equal (ݏ� = ݏ�), the model has no meaningful 
solution for z. All wealth would be concentrated in the hand of workers, if capitalists have no 
access to wage income.7  
The long-run solution for capacity utilisation, the profit rate and the growth rate are: 
                                                          
7 Meade (1964) points this out, see also Taylor (2014). 
ݑ∗∗ = ߚ଴ + ߚଶ�ݏ�� − ߚଵ  ݎ∗∗ = ሺߚ଴ + ߚଶ�ሻ�ݏ�� − ߚଵ  �∗∗ = ݏ�ሺߚ଴ + ߚଶ�ሻ�ݏ�� − ߚଵ  
Note that theǇ aƌe Ŷoǁ iŶdepeŶdeŶt fƌoŵ ǁoƌkeƌs͛ saǀiŶg ƌate. The Kaleckian principle, that 
͚capitalists eaƌŶ ǁhat theǇ speŶd͛ (Kalecki, 1971) applies here in a broader sense, i.e. that a 
higher saving rate of capitalists would diminish capacity utilisation, the profit rate and the 
growth rate in equilibrium. 
The long-run solutions for the wealth-to-income ratio and personal income distribution are �∗∗ = ݏ�� − ߚଵߚ଴ + ߚଶ� ߠ∗∗ = ݏ�� − ݏ�ݏ�ሺͳ − �ሻ 
The personal income distribution also does not depend on the growth rate, but only on the 
profit share and the two saving rates. The wealth-to-income ratio on the other hand is higher, 
the lower the growth parameter ߚ଴. This is iŶ liŶe ǁith PikettǇ͛s aƌguŵeŶt that sloǁ eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
growth would raise x. Nevertheless, it has no impact on the distribution of wealth. 
For the wealth-to-income ratio, PikettǇ͛s seĐoŶd fuŶdaŵeŶtal ͚law͛ (which they refer to as an 
accounting identity, Piketty and Zucman (2014: 1274) and call the ͞Haƌƌod-Domar-Solow 
foƌŵula͟ (Piketty and Zucman 2014: 1257)) is fulfilled: �∗∗ = ݏ� 
where ݏ = ݏ�[ሺͳ − �ሻ + �ሺͳ − �ሻ] + ݏ��� is the aggregate saving rate of the economy.8 In 
contrast to Piketty, however, as noted above, in our model the aggregate saving rate and the 
growth rate adjust endogenously through the change in the wealth share until they reach the 
long-run equilibrium. 
In the Post-Keynesian model, the wealth-to-income ratio and the personal income distribution 
are thus determined simultaneously with all the other (short-term) variables for any wealth 
share z. This is iŶ ĐoŶtƌast to PikettǇ͛s ŵodel ǁheƌe the ǁealth-to-income ratio is the result of 
the developments of the (constant) profit rate and the (constant) growth rate over time. 
It should ďe ŵeŶtioŶed that oŶe of PikettǇ͛s ŵaiŶ theoƌetiĐal ƌepeƌĐussioŶ of a ƌisiŶg ǁealth-
to-income ratio is that the profit share falls. In the Post-Keynesian model, in contrast, we 
folloǁ ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ aŶd tƌeat the pƌofit shaƌe as eǆogeŶous. IŶ ĐoŶtƌast to PikettǇ͛ ŵodel, it is 
the profit rate that varies according to changes in capacity utilisation. For Post-Keynesians, the 
                                                          
8 The mathematical proof is available upon request. 
profit share is determined by the power of workers and capitalists, which has significantly 
shifted in the direction of the latter since the 1980s. The deregulation of trade and capital 
flows as well as of financial markets and institutional changes has brought labour in the 
defensive; the result was a secular fall of the profit share. 
Nevertheless, the profit share can also be endogenously determined within the model. Taylor 
(2014) briefly discusses the stabilising and destabilising mechanisms in such a model. The 
outcome however is ambiguous. While the profit share in such a model increases along with 
a rising wealth share, its long-run stability depends on the parameters of the model. For a 
wide range of values, a stable long-run equilibrium wealth share is very likely, so that the 
results of the abovementioned analysis remain valid. However, there is also the possibility of 
aŶ ͚eǆplosiǀe tƌajeĐtoƌǇ͛ ǁheƌe at its eŶd all ǁealth is ĐoŶĐeŶtƌated iŶ the haŶd of Đapitalists. 
This ǁould oďǀiouslǇ ǀalidate PikettǇ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ͛s pƌediĐtioŶs. To eǆaŵine the dynamics of such a 
model is however beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
d. Transitional dynamics 
Another way to derive the Cambridge equation is to take the derivatives of the wealth share 
z with respect to time and rewrite the differential equation. �̇ = �ܸܸ̇ − �ܸܸܸ̇ଶ = ቆ �ܸܸ̇� − ܸܸ̇ቇ �ܸܸ = ሺݏ�ݎ − �ሻ� 
It immediately follows that the wealth share is only stable if the Cambridge equation is 
fulfilled.9 Furthermore, it is obvious that the wealth share z rises if ݏ�ݎ > �. If this inequality 
holds, the ;peƌĐeŶtageͿ iŶĐƌease iŶ Đapitalists͛ ǁealth is higheƌ than the (percentage) increase 
iŶ total ǁealth. PikettǇ͛s faŵous ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ of Đapitalisŵ͛ ݎ > � would thus 
be a special case of this inequality when ݏ� = ͳ, i.e. when capitalists accumulate all their 
income.10 The only (albeit very important) difference is, that in the Post-Keynesian model the 
profit rate and the growth rate are Ŷot eǆogeŶous aŶd ĐoŶstaŶt, as iŶ PikettǇ͛s ŵodel, ďut aƌe 
both endogenously determined and adjust simultaneously until the long-run equilibrium is 
reached. 
From the short-run solutions for r* and g* we see that both the profit rate and the growth 
rate decrease unambiguously when the wealth share rises. A higher wealth share reduces 
aggregate demand and thus also the profit rate and the growth rate. As long as � < �∗∗, both 
rates are higher than their long-run equilibria, i.e. ݎ∗ > ݎ∗∗ and �∗ > �∗∗. For low wealth 
shaƌes, the iŶĐƌease iŶ Đapitalists͛ ǁealth is higher than the one in total wealth, and the 
inequality ݏ�ݎ > � is fulfilled. ConseƋueŶtlǇ, Đapitalists͛ wealth share rises.  
                                                          
9 Another (trivial) solution of the differential equation would be � = Ͳ.  
10 Piketty (2014, p. 26, emphasis addedͿ ǁƌites that „…when the rate of return significantly exceeds the growth 
ƌate of the eĐoŶoŵǇ…͞, ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe iŶteƌpƌeted aloŶg the liŶes of the aďoǀeŵeŶtioŶed iŶeƋualitǇ (López-
Bernardo et al., 2016). 
PikettǇ͛s ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ͛ of capitalism, that the wealth concentration increases if 
and because ݎ > �, is therefore valid in the Post-Keynesian model when z is below its long-
term equilibrium. If r is ͞significantly gƌeateƌ͟ thaŶ g, the wealth share of capitalists will rise. 
Nevertheless, iŶ ĐoŶtƌast to PikettǇ͛s ǀieǁ, this can only be a temporary situation. When the 
wealth share reaches its equilibrium value, the Cambridge equation is fulfilled and the wealth 
share remains constant. 
The profit rate and the growth rate are not the only variables that depend on the wealth share, 
as discussed in section 3.b. As long as z goes up, capacity utilisation decreases. Furthermore, 
the wealth-to-income ratio, which is the inverse of the former, rises. The personal income 
distribution becomes more unequal, since a higher wealth share shifts profits from workers 
to capitalists. 
IŶ the ͚tƌaŶsitioŶal phase͛, i.e. as loŶg as the ǁealth shaƌe is ďeloǁ its loŶg-run equilibrium, 
the Post-Keynesian ŵodel thus pƌediĐts a deǀelopŵeŶt of the ǀaƌiaďles iŶ liŶe ǁith PikettǇ͛s 
(2014) empirical data. Both wealth and income distributions become more unequal, the 
wealth-to-income ratio increases, and economic growth weakens. However, the mechanisms 
behind these developments are in stark contrast to those Piketty had in mind. Not only will 
the wealth share eventually reach its stable long-run equilibrium, but all variables are 
determined within the model and adjust simultaneously. 
FinallǇ, let us ďƌieflǇ look at the effeĐts of a sloǁdoǁŶ iŶ gƌoǁth. IŶ PikettǇ͛s ǀieǁ (2014: 233), 
a lower growth rate raises the wealth-to-income ratio, which entails a more unequal income 
distribution. In the Post-Keynesian model, a fall in the growth rate (which is represented by a 
lower value for ߚ଴), reduces both the long-run profit rate and the long-run growth rate, so 
that the Cambridge equation is unaffected. It has thus no effect on the distribution of wealth 
and income. However, it reduces capacity utilisation and raises the wealth-to-income ratio. In 
short, while a higher wealth share entails a reduction in the growth rate (due to changes in 
the saving rates or the profit share), the reverse is not true. 
 
e. Model extensions 
The simple version of the model above is analytically tractable, but it arguably does not yet 
Đaptuƌe the spiƌit of PikettǇ͛s many-faceted analysis. This section therefore discusses three 
possible extensions to the simple model, which nonetheless retains the Post-Keynesian 
properties that were derived in the previous section. We introduce (1) blended income for 
capitalists, (2) differential rates of returns across workers and capitalists, and (3) capital gains.  
First, in the basic version of the model, all wages accrued to workers. However, Piketty 
emphasizes that wages play an important (if diminishing) role even at the very top of the 
income distribution. Empirically, the share of wages received by capitalists lies between 5 and 
10 per cent for the US and most EU-countries (Taylor et al. 2015, Ederer and Rehm 2017). In 
the vein of Palley (2017b), the model can thus be extended by ďleŶdiŶg Ŷot just ǁoƌkeƌs͛, ďut 
also Đapitalists͛ iŶĐoŵe souƌĐes, i.e. distƌiďutiŶg wages between workers and capitalists. As 
Ederer and Rehm (2017) show, the personal income distribution is then more skewed towards 
capitalists than in the simple case since workers now receive less (wage) income. 
Second, Piketty points to differential rates of return – the higher the wealth owned, the higher 
the returns on this wealth (Piketty 2014: 447f). The reasons for differential returns across the 
wealth distribution might lie, among others, in more professional wealth management at 
higher wealth levels, the ability to take higher risk, or a higher likelihood of insider knowledge. 
Empirical analysis (Ederer and Rehm 2017) finds that the composition of wealth varies 
between workers and capitalists in particular, with the former holding a larger share of their 
wealth in low-yield asset classes (in particular bank deposits). The implication for the 
distribution of profits is that capitalists receive higher capital income and thus benefit more 
from the compound interest effect. We thus distinguish between two asset types within 
productive wealth: deposits, which we assume for simplicity to be non-interest bearing, and 
profit-generating assets, which yield profit income. 
Third, capital gains are an important form through which retained earnings of firms are 
distributed to the owners. Even though Piketty does not emphasize them in his theoretical 
considerations, his empirical results show that they are highly relevant. These capitals gains 
solely depend on the saving rate of firms and can be integrated into a Post-Keynesian model 
(López-Bernardo et al., 2016b; Taylor et al., 2017). Since capitalists typically hold a larger share 
of their wealth in profit-generating assets, a higher saving rate of firms skews the distribution 
of wealth and income towards them. Furthermore, a higher saving rate of firms can be 
expected to reduce demand, capacity utilisation and growth, since firms by definition have a 
saving rate equal to one and therefore a higher saving rate than capitalists and workers. 
With these extensions, the analytical solution of the model becomes more complicated than 
in the basic version (see Appendix B). Capitalists͛ ǁealth shaƌe Ŷoǁ depeŶds Ŷot oŶlǇ oŶ the 
saving rates of workers and capitalists and on the profit share, but furthermore on the 
distribution of wages between workers and capitalists, on their respective shares of wealth 
held as profit-generating assets, and on the saving rate of firms. The higheƌ Đapitalists͛ shaƌe 
of the wage bill, the higher is their wealth share in the long run. The higher the share of 
Đapitalists͛ ǁealth held iŶ the foƌŵ of pƌofit-generating assets, the higher is their wealth share 
(the same holds for workers). The higher the saving rate of firms, the higher is the wealth 
share of capitalists. This extended model nevertheless exhibits the same short- and long-run 
dynamic as its basic version. 
 
4. Simulating the dynamics 
As section 3.d showed, even though the Post-Keynesian wealth model does not corroborate 
PikettǇ͛s theory of a corner solution for the wealth concentration, his empirical analysis is 
consistent with a transitional phase during which the wealth share of capitalists is below its 
long-term equilibrium. We therefore focus on the transitional dynamics next in order to 
illustrate the behaviour of the extended model in this phase.  
The model is calibrated using parameters from the empirical literature (Ederer and Rehm 
2017). As discussed in section 3e, the relevant parameters are the saving rates of workers and 
capitalists, the share of wealth held as profit-generating assets by workers and by capitalists, 
the profit share, the distribution parameter for wages (between workers and capitalists) and 
the saving rate of firms. For details on the parameter values and sources, see Table A1 in the 
Appendix.  
Figure 1 shows a benchmark simulation using the average parameter values of all ten 
European countries11 for which data is available. It depicts the dynamics of the model for 
capacity utilization ݑ in the top left panel and for the wealth-income ratio � (which, as is clearly 
visible in the graphic, is the inverse of capacity utilization) at the top right. On the bottom, it 
shows the profit rate ݎ and the growth rate � on the left, and wealth concentration � and 
income concentration ߠ (as above, measured as the ratio of capitalists wealth and income to 
ǁoƌkeƌ͛s ǁealth aŶd iŶĐoŵe, ƌespeĐtively). 
 
Figure 1: Short- and long-run dynamics of the Post-Keynesian wealth model for Europe 
 
Source: own elaboration.  
Note: This graph shows the dynamic in capacity utilisation ݑ, the wealth-to-income ratio �, 
the profit rate ݎ, the growth rate �, capitalists͛ ǁealth shaƌe �, and the ƌatio of Đapitalists͛ 
iŶĐoŵe to ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶĐoŵe ;peƌsoŶal iŶĐoŵe distƌiďutioŶͿ ߠ. For parameter starting values, 
see Appendix A. 
                                                          
11 These countries comprise Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Malta, Portugal, and 
Slovakia. 
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 There are three main findings: First, the profit rate is always higher than the growth rate. 
However, the differential decreases over time – if slightly – as the wealth share rises until it 
reaches an equilibrium. Second, the model clearly approaches an equilibrium in the long run; 
the wealth-to-income ratio, wealth and income inequality do not rise indefinitely. Third, 
however, during a transitional phase over the next 50 to 100 years, the model points to a 
steep rise in these variables, and a concomitant fall in capacity utilization.  
The fiƌst ƌesult ĐoŶfiƌŵs PikettǇ͛s ͚fiƌst laǁ͛ of Đapitalism, ݎ > �. This, however, holds by 
definition in a Post-KeǇŶesiaŶ ŵodel due to PasiŶetti͛s ͚ Caŵďƌidge eƋuatioŶ͛, ݏ�ݎ = � (except 
for the unrealistic case in which capitalists do not consume, so that their saving rate is equal 
to one). The direction of change, however, contrasts with Piketty, who suggests that the 
differential between the two rates, if anything, will widen. 
The second finding is in clear contradiction to Piketty (2014: 361), who says that ͞The fact that 
the return on capital is distinctly and persistently greater than the growth rate is a powerful 
force for a more unequal distribution.͟ Leaving aside historical contingencies and caveats, 
which Piketty (2014: 361f) is careful to discuss and include, PikettǇ͛s bare-bones model 
predicts an ever-increasing wealth share, and thus eventually a corner solution for the 
concentration of wealth, in which a tiny elite owns all wealth. In contrast, our calibrated 
simulation confirms the theoretical finding from our analytical model, namely that the wealth 
share held by capitalists usually stabilizes at an interior solution. In the Post-Keynesian world, 
both workers and capitalists own a stable share of wealth. 
Our third finding bridges the gap between a Post-Keynesian aŶalǇsis aŶd PikettǇ͛s eŵpiƌiĐal 
fiŶdiŶgs, oƌ, put diffeƌeŶtlǇ, it pƌoǀides aŶ aŶalǇtiĐal uŶdeƌpiŶŶiŶg to PikettǇ͛s ǁoƌk. During 
the transition phase from the current state towards the long-run equilibrium, all variables 
exhibit the development described by Piketty: The share of wealth owned by capitalists, the 
Post-Keynesian eƋuiǀaleŶt to PikettǇ͛s ͚ elite͛ defiŶed ďǇ peƌĐeŶtiles of the wealth distribution, 
rises unequivocally and by significant levels from under 50% to more than 60%. Similarly, the 
wealth-to-income ratio increases to around 5. In addition, personal income inequality 
increases, i.e. the ratio of capitalists͛ income to ǁoƌkeƌs͛ iŶĐoŵe rises from just below 40% to 
roughly 50%. As with wealth, Piketty measures these as income share of percentiles of the 
income distribution. To conclude, these aƌe the ŵaiŶ ŵessages of PikettǇ͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ďook: the 
wealth-to-income ratio, the wealth concentration, and personal income inequality will all 
increase, if capitalism is left to its own devices.  
Figure 2 shows the effect of a rise in ͚aŶiŵal spiƌits͛, i.e. the exogenous component of the 
investment function ߚ଴. Piketty does not focus on the growth regime in too much detail, but 
here, too, our findings from the calibrated model are in line with his broad predictions – and, 
as expected, with Post-Keynesian models: If autonomous investment increases, the profit rate 
and the growth rate rise, as does capacity utilization, so the wealth-to-income ratio falls. 
However, the simulations also make clear that a change in autonomous investment has only 
transient effects on the distribution of wealth. In the long-ƌuŶ, Đapitalists͛ ǁealth shaƌe 
approaches the same value as in the baseline simulation. The equilibrium value for the wealth 
share does not depend on the growth rate since the profit rate also increases endogenously, 
so that the Cambridge equation is fulfilled at the same value for z as before.  
 
Figure 2: Effects of an increase in the growth rate on short- and long-run dynamics of the Post-
Keynesian wealth model in Europe 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Note: This graph shows the dynamic in the profit rate ݎ, the growth rate �, the wealth-to-
income ratio �, aŶd Đapitalists͛ ǁealth shaƌe � following an increase in autonomous 
investment, compared to a baseline scenario. For parameter starting values, see Appendix A. 
 
5. The effects of a wealth tax 
Piketty͛s (2014: 532) solution for his predicted increasing wealth concentration and rising 
wealth-to-income ratio is a global wealth tax. Although Post-Keynesian criticize the proposal 
for being utopian (Palley 2014), it is nevertheless interesting to investigate the effects of a 
wealth tax in the Post-Keynesian model.  
Piketty (2014: 571) (tentatively) suggests a tax of 0.1% on wealth up to 200.000 Euro, 0.5% up 
to 1 million Euro, 1% up to 5 million Euro, 2% up to 1 billion Euro, and 5% (to 10%) on wealth 
greater than a billion Euro. For simplicity, we use the average for the lower two brackets (0.3%) 
as ǁoƌkeƌs͛ aǀeƌage taǆ ƌate aŶd the aǀeƌage of the higheƌ thƌee tax brackets (4.3%) as 
Đapitalists͛ taǆ ƌate. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, we formulate the tax a flat rate ݐ on the total wealth of both 
workers and capitalists and we assume that tax earnings are spent as government 
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consumption to maintain the stock-flow consistency of the model.12 Income of capitalists and 
workers becomes  �� = �� − ݐ� �ܸ �� = ܹ + ሺͳ − �ሻ� − ݐ� �ܸ 
For the dynamic equations, see Appendix B. 
Figure 3 shows that the wealth tax redistributes income from capitalists (with a higher saving 
rate) to workers.  It therefore raises capacity utilisation and simultaneously reduces the 
wealth-income ratio, while the growth rate and the profit rate also rise. Most importantly 
hoǁeǀeƌ, fƌoŵ PikettǇ͛s poiŶt of ǀieǁ, the wealth share of capitalists would fall noticeably, 
from roughly 0.62% in the baseline scenario to about 50%. That is, a wealth tax as suggested 
by Piketty would neutralize the rise in wealth inequality predicted by the model.  This 
reduction in the wealth share is permanent, as long as the tax is imposed periodically. 
Conversely, one-off levies only have a transitory effect as the wealth concentration returns to 
its long-run equilibrium. 
 
Figure 3: Effects of a wealth tax on short- and long-run dynamics of the Post-Keynesian wealth 
model in Europe  
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Note: This graph shows the dynamic in the wealth-to-income ratio �, aŶd Đapitalists͛ ǁealth 
share � foƌ a ǁealth taǆ of Ϭ.ϯ% oŶ ǁoƌkeƌs͛ aŶd ϰ.ϯ% of Đapitalists͛ ǁealth, Đoŵpaƌed to a 
baseline scenario. For parameter starting values, see Appendix A. 
 
Other taxes that reduce the income of capitalists and thus dampen their ability to accumulate 
wealth, such as an inheritance tax or income taxes for capitalists, are fungible to a wealth tax; 
they will lead to the same effects as the ones described in Figure 4. In fact, in the Post-
                                                          
12 Another way to balance the budget would be to spend all tax revenue on monetary transfers. Transfers directly 
increase the income of households and have a distributive effect themselves given that workers and capitalists 
benefit differently from them. Public consumption on the other hand has no direct distributive effect in the 
ŵodel, ǁhiĐh alloǁs us to isolate the sole effeĐt of PikettǇ͛s taǆ ƌates. 
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Keynesian model, these different taxes can easily be calibrated to yield identical results. If 
wealth is passed on to the next generation every 25 years, an inheritance tax of 60% has on 
average the same incidence as a general (yearly) wealth tax of 2,4% (which is our average tax 
rate). Similarly, introducing a tax on capital income of approximately 30% leads to a similar 
result, given that the profit rate in the simulation is about 8%.13 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper developed a Post-Keynesian model with an endogenous distribution of wealth 
between workers and capitalists, and extended it by including blended wage and capital 
income of both workers and capitalists, differential returns on assets between workers and 
capitalists, and capital gains which reflect the increase in firm value due to retained earnings. 
We looked into the short- and long-run dynamic of the model, disĐussed PikettǇ͛s theoƌetiĐal 
arguments against its background, and evaluated his proposal of a wealth tax. 
PikettǇ͛s ŵaiŶ pƌediĐtioŶ is that a sŵall elite ǁill oǁŶ all ǁealth if Đapitalism is left to its own 
devices. Our model permits this corner solution of all (or zero) wealth held by capitalists, but 
usually economies will show a stable long-run wealth distribution in which workers have a 
positive wealth share. In such an equilibrium, the wealth-to-income ratio is stable, and there 
is a (stable and positive) gap between the profit rate and the growth rate, which is given by 
the Cambridge equation. The specific level of the equilibrium wealth distribution between 
workers and capitalists depends on their saving rates, the profit share, the share of wage 
income that accrues to capitalists, the differential returns on wealth for the two household 
groups, and the saving rate of firms.  
We therefore reject this theoretical conclusion of Piketty. However, we show that the model 
has a transitional phase, i.e. when the wealth share of capitalists is below its long-term 
equilibrium, iŶ ǁhiĐh the ŵodel ďehaǀes aĐĐoƌdiŶg to PikettǇ͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ eŵpiƌiĐal fiŶdiŶgs foƌ 
high-income countries since the 1980s. In this situation, the wealth share of capitalists 
increases endogenously. Furthermore, the wealth-to-income ratio rises, the differential 
between the profit rate and the growth rate gradually decreases (but is always higher than 
the long-term gap), and income inequality rises. Consistent with Keynesian logic, a rising 
wealth share reduces aggregate demand and thus capacity utilization and growth. The paper 
thus pƌoǀides theoƌetiĐal fouŶdatioŶs to PikettǇ͛s abundant empirical findings.  
Concretely, our simulations show that wealth inequality in Europe – as measured by 
Đapitalists͛ ǁealth shaƌe –would rise from well under 50% to more than 60%. This level differs 
substantially across individual countries, as Ederer and Rehm (2017) show. Finally, we 
evaluate the effects of a wealth tax, which Piketty suggested for addressing the increasing 
concentration of wealth. The model shows that the introduction of a permanent wealth tax at 
levels suggested by Piketty (or, equivalently, a suitable inheritance tax or capital income tax) 
                                                          
13 However, it should be noted that this back-of-the-envelope calculation does not take into account that an 
income tax does not capture capital gains. 
can indeed neutralize the rise in wealth inequality predicted by the model by reducing the 
equilibrium value for the wealth share owned by capitalists in Europe – and thus the wealth 
concentration – to 50%. It also reduces the wealth-to-income ratio and dampens income 
inequality. 
There are a number of interesting avenues for future work. First, expanding the analysis to 
other countries, such as the U.S., is an obvious next step. Second, endogenizing the profit 
share and working through the stability aspects of such a model might provide valuable insight 
iŶto poteŶtial ͚PikettǇ dǇŶaŵiĐs͛ iŶ a KeǇŶesiaŶ fƌaŵeǁoƌk. Third, delving into the policy 
research might yield more detailed information on the relative merits of a wealth tax versus 
an inheritance tax or capital income taxes.  
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Appendix A: Parameter values 
Table A.1: Parameter values for the model calibration, average over countries 
Parameter Value Source ݏ�  0.07 Ederer/Rehm 2018, Data: EHBS ݏ�  0.24 Ederer/Rehm 2018, Data: EHBS �  0.39 Ederer/Rehm 2018, Data: HFCS ߙ  0.06 Ederer/Rehm 2018, Data: HFCS ߛ�  0.49 Ederer/Rehm 2018, Data: HFCS ߛ_ݎ  0.91 Ederer/Rehm 2018, Data: HFCS 
 
Note: Rows refer to: (1) ݏ� saving rate of workers, (2) ݏ� saving rate of capitalists, (3) � profit 
share, (4) ߙ share of capitalists in the wage bill, (5) ߛ� shaƌe of ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ǁealth held iŶ pƌofit-
generating assets, (6) ߛ� share of capitalists͛ ǁealth held iŶ pƌofit-generating assets. In order 
to reproduce the empirical results of Ederer and Rehm (2017), we set the parameter for the 
saving rate of firms equal to zero. Since the empirical value of this parameter is usually higher, 
the long-run values of the simulations are on the conservative side.  
 
Appendix B: Extended model 
Table B.1: Transaction flow matrix in the extended model 
 Households Firms Banks  
 Workers Capitalists Current Capital Capital Total 
Consumption −ܥ� −ܥ� +ܥ   0 
Investment   +� −�  0 
Wages + �ܹ + �ܹ −ܹ   0 
Profits +�� +�� −� +�௙  0 
Equity −∆ܧ� −∆ܧ�  +∆ܧ  0 
Deposits −∆ܦ� −∆ܦ�   +∆ܦ 0 
Loans    +∆ܮ −∆ܮ 0 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
  
Table B.2: Balance sheet matrix in the extended model 
 Households    
 Workers Capitalists Firms Banks Total 
Capital   +ܭ  +ܭ 
Equity +ܧ� +ܧ� −ܧ  0 
Deposits +ܦ� +ܦ�  −ܦ 0 
Loans   −ܮ +ܮ 0 
Wealth − �ܸ − �ܸ − ௙ܸ  −ܸ 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Retained profits: �௙ = ߟ� 
Disposable income: �� = ሺͳ − ߙሻܹ + ߛ�ሺͳ − �ሻߛ�ሺͳ − �ሻ + ߛ�� ሺͳ − ߟሻ� �� = ߙܹ + ߛ��ߛ�ሺͳ − �ሻ + ߛ�� ሺͳ − ߟሻ� 
Wealth dynamic: �̇ = �ܸܸ̇ − �� = {ݏ� [ሺͳ − �ሻߙ + ߛ��ߛ�ሺͳ − �ሻ + ߛ�� ሺͳ − ߟሻ�] + ߛ��ߛ�ሺͳ − �ሻ + ߛ�� ߟ�} ݑ − �� 
 
Appendix C: Basic model with a (progressive) wealth tax 
Table C.1: Stocks and flows in the model with a wealth tax 
 Households Firms State  
 Workers Capitalists Current Capital Current Total 
Consumption −ܥ� −ܥ� +ܥ  +ܥ௚ 0 
Investment   +� −�  0 
Wages +ܹ  −ܹ   0 
Profits +�� +�� −�   0 
Taxes −�� −��   +� 0 
Wealth −∆ �ܸ −∆ �ܸ  +∆ܭ 0 0 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Wealth dynamic: �̇ = [ݏ�ሺݎ − ݐ�ሻ − �]� �∗ = ሺߚ଴ + ߚଶ�ሻሺݏ�� − ݏ�ሻ + ߚଵሺݏ�ݐ� − ݏ�ݐ�ሻ − ݏ�ݏ�ሺݐ� − ݐ��ሻሺߚ଴ + ߚଶ�ሻሺݏ� − ݏ�ሻ� + ߚଵሺݏ�ݐ� − ݏ�ݐ�ሻ − ݏ�ݏ��ሺݐ� − ݐ�ሻ 
